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013.07.0Abstract Redundant techniques are widely adopted in vehicle management computer (VMC) to
ensure that VMC has high reliability and safety. At the same time, it makes VMC have special char-
acteristics, e.g., failure correlation, event simultaneity, and failure self-recovery. Accordingly, the
reliability and safety analysis to redundant VMC system (RVMCS) becomes more difﬁcult. Aimed
at the difﬁculties in RVMCS reliability modeling, this paper adopts generalized stochastic Petri nets
to establish the reliability and safety models of RVMCS. Then this paper analyzes RVMCS oper-
ating states and potential threats to ﬂight control system. It is veriﬁed by simulation that the reli-
ability of VMC is not the product of hardware reliability and software reliability, and the
interactions between hardware and software faults can reduce the real reliability of VMC obviously.
Furthermore, the failure undetected states and false alarming states inevitably exist in RVMCS due
to the inﬂuences of limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of fault mon-
itoring devices (FMD). RVMCS operating in some failure undetected states will produce fatal
threats to the safety of ﬂight control system. RVMCS operating in some false alarming states will
reduce utility of RVMCS obviously. The results abstracted in this paper can guide reliable VMC
and efﬁcient FMD designs. The methods adopted in this paper can also be used to analyze other
intelligent systems’ reliability.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of CSAA & BUAA.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
As the core of aircraft control and management, vehicle man-
agement computer (VMC) integrates functions of ﬂight con-
trol, survey equipment management, navigation and ﬂight82338917.
om (J. Shi), mengyixuan-
orial Committee of CJA.
g by Elsevier
ing by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of C
36status management together. Ensuring that VMC has perfect
function, good performance, and high reliability becomes a
key task in ﬂight control system design.1–4
In order to improve VMC’s ﬂight mission reliability and
safety, redundant techniques5–8 are popularly adopted, for
example, world-famous modern ﬁghters (such as F-16, F/A-
18, EF2000) popularly adopt quadruple-redundant VMC to
reduce potential disasters due to single VMC’s failure. At the
same time, fault monitoring devices (FMD), such as built-in
test (BIT) are widely adopted in redundant vehicle manage-
ment computer system (RVMCS) to realize fault detection
and isolation.9 Ideally, reliability and safety of RVMCS is
higher than that of single VMC with the assumptions that
FMD can correctly detect and isolate system’s failures withSAA & BUAA. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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cial characteristics, such as failure correlation, event simultane-
ity, and failure self-recovery, reliability and safety analysis for
RVMCS becomes more complicated. In the traditional analy-
sis for RVMCS, reliability block diagram (RBD)-based or
fault tree analysis (FTA)-based models are established accord-
ing to the structure and composition of RVMCS.10 However,
FTA-based and RBD-based models can only describe logical
combinations among VMC elements’ failures (e.g., processor,
system disc, software, etc.) while they are difﬁcult to deal with
fault interactions which widely exist in RVMCS. Moreover,
impact of software failures on RVMCS generally is inadequate
in traditional RVMCS reliability modeling analysis. Even
though many publications11–17 have been devoted to the avail-
ability analysis of combined hardware and software systems,
work on both aspects which are dealt with at the same time
is not prevalent. Moreover, even when hardware and software
aspects are considered together for real systems, the sources of
faults are not explicitly distinguished. Therefore, the tradi-
tional reliability modeling methods are unavailable to analyze
RVMCS reliability and survivability accurately because they
cannot reﬂect actual RVMCS failure mechanism. In addition,
analysis of redundant airborne computer in literature mainly
focuses on redundancy structures and management strategies,
onboard computer tests, BIT false alarms and solving strate-
gies.9 Ref.9 studies the triplicated system reliability and respec-
tively analyzes inﬂuence over one and two monitoring
coverage on system reliability. For ignoring system self-recov-
ery and impact of false alarm rate, the analysis results in Ref.18
have certain limitations. In this case, generalized stochastic
Petri nets (GSPN) are adopted to analyze complicated systems
with self-recovery and FMD.19,20 Ref.19 adopts GSPN to build
a reliability model of dual-redundant switcher systems and pre-
liminarily analyzes relevant relationship between software fail-
ures and hardware failures. However, this model only
considers the inﬂuence of hardware failures on software reli-
ability without analyzing the possible impact that software
abnormal operation exerts on hardware operating. At the
same time, missing rate and false alarm rate are not considered
in reliability modeling, so accordingly, potential safety hazards
of the system cannot be obtained.
Based on the key issues in current RVMCS reliability and
survivability analysis, this paper analyzes RVMCS failure
mechanism, and then establishes a single-board compute mod-
el based on the mechanism of software and hardware failures
by advantages of GSPN hierarchy and modular modeling.
Then, on the basis of this, an airborne redundancy switch
model is established with considering the effects of monitoring
voting device detection rate and false alarm rate.
The structure of this paper is organized as the following.
The second part gives the GSPN model description of
RVMCS; the third part speciﬁcally establishes a hierarchical
GSPN model of RVMCS; the fourth part mainly analyzes
the reliability and safety analysis of RVMCS; the ﬁfth part
makes the conclusions.
2. GSPN model description of RVMCS
2.1. Failure mechanism analysis of RVMCS
The processor, system disc, data discs, network interface card
(NIC), and small computer system interface (SCSI) controllerscompose of VMC hardware. There are four reasons that can
lead to hardware failures during operation: imperfect design-
ing, defect in production, over charging, and aging. When
one of the drawbacks is induced by certain internal or external
factors, performance of the hardware will be degraded. How-
ever, not all faults taking place will be transformed into system
failures and need to be recovered by maintenance. A hardware
fault which occurs just in a short period and vanishes with the
disappearing of distributes subsequently is deﬁned as hardware
temporary fault (HTF). In this circumstance, VMC can oper-
ate normally and the hardware can fulﬁll its function because
HTF can be removed automatically when external conditions
related with the fault disappear. On the other hand, the system
performance will degrade if the fault is permanent and
the failed hardware needs to be repaired. In this case, failure
of the hardware is called as hardware permanent failure
(HPF).
As for the software, its failure mechanism is quite different
from the hardware. Generally, defaults inevitably remain in
the software bodies during software designing. Software de-
faults can be motivated by certain input. With activated de-
faults, the software will go into a disordered state. In this
case, the software usually will not lose its function immediately
and can be recovered by fault tolerant designs (such as recov-
ery block, N-version programming software) if the error can
be detected. In this case, software disorder is named as soft-
ware temporary fault (STF). Otherwise, the disorder will ex-
pand until the speciﬁcation requirement is dissatisﬁed, which
is named as software failure (SF). If a software failure occurs,
RVMCS performance and reliability will drop gradually and
the system needs to restart to recover operation.
Taking consideration of the interactions between hardware
and software faults and the inﬂuence of limited fault monitor-
ing coverage and false alarming probability of FMD, the fail-
ure mechanism of RVMCS is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, RW presents the RVMCS operating state. For
RVMCS hardware, excessive interior and exterior stresses
(such as high temperature, excessive vibration, abnormal air
pressure, and unexpected electric stress) will cause hardware
performance to degrade, and then the hardware temporary
failure happens, i.e., the transmission from RW to HTF in
Fig. 1. If the stresses continue impacting on the hardware for
a while, VMS will fail, i.e., the transmission from HTF to
RF in Fig. 1. As for the software, the software defaults are
activated by certain input. Then, the software will go into a
disordered inner state, i.e., STF in Fig. 1. If the disorder con-
tinues expanding, the software failure occurs; therefore, the
transmission from STF to RF takes place.
Besides the hardware and the software fail independently,
the interactions between hardware and software faults are sig-
niﬁcant in RVMCS. An error due to the activation of a tempo-
rary hardware fault (such as processor overheating, buffer
overﬂowing) may propagate to the hosted software and lead
the software entering the disordered inner state, i.e., the trans-
mission process from HTF to STF in Fig. 1. On the other
hand, the uncorrected software faults’ continuous inﬂuences
will cause the hardware performance degrading. This interac-
tion process is illustrated as the transmission from STF to
HTF in Fig. 1.
Furthermore, the false alarming of FMD will inﬂuence uti-
lization of single VMS, and then decrease the reliability of
RVMCS. The missing detection of FMD brings dangerous
Fig. 1 Failure transmitting process of RVMCS.
1292 J. Shi et al.operating state, and hinders the implementation of system
reconstruction strategies.
2.2. GSPN model description of RVMCS
2.2.1. Assumptions
The analysis and results in this paper are based on the follow-
ing assumptions.
Assumption 1. The failures of the VMC hardware can be
removed by restarting the hardware or replacing failed
components. Both the failing and recovering time of the
hardware submit the exponential distribution.
Assumption 2. The failures of the VMC software can be
removed by restarting the software. Both the failing and recov-
ering time of the software submit the exponential distribution.
Assumption 3. VMC1 and VMC2 compose of warm-standby
RVMCS. FMD is adopted in RVMCS to realize fault detec-
tion and isolation. FMD has limited fault monitoring coverage
and false alarming probability.2.2.2. Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 1. The GSPN-based model of the VMC hardware is
described as:
GSPNH ¼ SH;TH;FH;KH;WH;MH0;KHð Þ ð1Þ
In the model, SH= {H_w,H_ab,H_re,H_fa,H_fr,H_de} is
the marking set. The elements in SH describe the potential states
of the VMC hardware. The detailed description to each element
in SH is shown in Section 3.1. TH is the transition set of GSPNH
which deﬁnes all dynamic processes in which the hardware fails
and recovers. TH= THt [ THi, and THt \ THi = Ø. Here,
THt = {tH1, tH2, tH3, tH4} deﬁnes the transition processes associ-
ated with transition rate and time, while THi =
{tHi1, tHi2, tHi3, tHi4} deﬁnes the transition process in which thesatisﬁed transition occurs instantaneously. FH is the arc set of
the model; WH is the arc weight set, and all arc weights in FH
are 1. The capacity function KH= {1,1,1,1,1,1} deﬁnes
capacities of each element in SH. MH0 = {1,0,0,0,0,0} deﬁnes
the initial state of GSPNH. It is supposed that the initial state
of the hardware is operational, i.e., #(H_w) = 1. KH ¼
fkH1; kH2; kH3; kH4g describes the transition rate set that the dif-
ferent states in GSPNH change between each other. kH1 is the
transition rate of the transmission from H_w toH_ab. The value
of kH1 reﬂects the frequency that the destructive factors exert on
the hardware.
Deﬁnition 2. The GSPN-based model of the VMC software is
described as:
GSPNW ¼ fSW;TW;FW;KW;WW;MW0;KWg ð2Þ
In the model, SW = {S_op,S_ab,S_de,S_fr,S_dr,S_-
fa,S_re} is the marking set. The elements in SW describe
the potential states of the VMC software. The detailed
description to each element in SW is shown in Section 3.2.
TW is the transition set of GSPNW which deﬁnes all dynamic
processes in which the software fails and restore.
TW = TWt [ TWi and TWt \ TWi = Ø. Here,
TWt = {tW1, tW2, tW3, tW4, tW5} deﬁnes the transition processes
in GSPNW associated with transition rate and time, while
TWi = {tWi1, tWi2, tWi3, tWi4} is the transient transition set
which deﬁnes the transition process in which the satisﬁed
transition occurs instantaneously. FW is the arc set of the
model; WW is the arc weight set, and all arc weights in FW
are 1. The capacity function KW = {1,1,1,1,1,1,1} deﬁnes
capacities of each element in SW. MW0 = {1,0,0,0,0,0,0} de-
ﬁnes the initial state of GSPNW. It is supposed that the initial
state of the software is operational, i.e., #(S_op) = 1.
KW ¼ fkS1; kS2; kS3; kS4; kS5g describes the transition rate set
associated with TWt.
Deﬁnition 3. The GSPN-based model of single VMC is
described as:
GSPNV ¼ GSPNH [GSPNW [DEP ð3Þ
Table 1 Steady states of the VMC hardware.
No. State
1 The hardware operates well
2 Performance of the hardware degrades due to the
inﬂuence of disturbances, and the hardware will recover
later after disturbances vanishing
3 Performance of the hardware degrades due to the
inﬂuence of disturbances, and the hardware will lose its
function later due to continuous impact of disturbances
4 The hardware fails due to the inﬂuence of disturbances.
It should be repaired and then recover to normal
operating state
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and software failures, which is
DEP ¼ fSD;TD;FD;KD;WD;MD0;KDg ð4Þ
where SD = KD =MD0 = Ø; TD is the transition set of DEP
which describes all the interactions between hardware and soft-
ware failures, TD = TDt [ TDi and TDt [ TDi = Ø. Here,
TDt = {tHtS, tStH} deﬁnes the transition processes in DEP asso-
ciated with transition rate and time, while TDi = {tHtSi1, tHtSi2,
tHtSi3, tHtSi4} is the transient transition set which deﬁnes the
transition process in which the satisﬁed transition occurs
instantaneously. FD is the arc set of the interaction model,
WD is the weight set of interaction arcs, and all arc weights
in FD are 1. KD ¼ fkHtS; kStHg describes the transition rate set
that the different states in DEP change between each other.
Deﬁnition 4. The GSPN-based model of RVMCS is described
as:
GSPNRV ¼ GSPNV1 [GSPNV2 [ FMD ð5Þ
where GSPNV1 and GSPNV2 denote the models of VMC1 and
VMC2, respectively, FMD is
FMD ¼ fSF;TF;FF;KF;WF;MF0;KFg ð6Þ
In the model, SF deﬁnes the states of RVMCS fault detec-
tion and isolation. TF is the transition set which deﬁnes all dy-
namic fault detection and isolation processes. FF is the arc set
of the model;WF is the arc weight set, and all arc weights in FF
are 1. The capacity function KF deﬁnes capacities of each ele-
ment in SF. MF0 deﬁnes the initial state of FMD. KF gives the
parameter set of fault detection rate and fault isolation rate.
3. GSPN model analysis of single VMC
3.1. GSPN model analysis of VMC hardware
According the deﬁnition of GSPNH, the GSPN model of the
VMC hardware is established as in Fig. 2.
According to GSPNH, MH0 = {1,0,0,0,0,0}, i.e.,
#(H_w) = 1, and the VMC hardware is operational in the ini-
tial condition. In the hardware’s subsequent operating, it could
fail by the inﬂuence of excessive stress, and then a token is
transmitted to H_ab from H_w, i.e., #(H_ab) = 1. The failure
that the VMC hardware encounters may be HTF with theFig. 2 GSPN model of the VMC hardware.probability of Pr(tHi2) or HPF with the probability of Pr(tHi1),
and Pr(tHi1) + Pr(tHi2) = 1. As for HPF (i.e., #(H_fr) = 1), it
will be removed by restarting the hardware subsequently. The
mean restarting time of the hardware is #(tH2) = 1=kH2. As for
HTF (#(H_de) = 1), it will be removed while excessive interior
and exterior stresses disappear, and then the hardware will re-
sume normal operating subsequently. The recovering rate of
the hardware in HTF is #(tH3) = 1=kH3. In addition, if exces-
sive interior and exterior stresses continue impacting on the
hardware for a period of time (#(tH4) = 1=kH4), HTF will
eventually transmit into HPF, and then the hardware is re-
started subsequently. Whether or not the interior and exterior
stresses continue impacting is determined by Pr(tHi3) and
Pr(tHi4), and PrðtHi3Þ þ PrðtHi4Þ ¼ 1.
It can be seen from the description of GSPNH that GSPNH
has four steady states which are summarized in Table 1.
According to Table 1, the continuous time Markov chain
(CTMC) model equivalent to GSPNH is shown in Fig. 3.
Based on the CTMC model of the VMC hardware, the state
transition equation is obtained as:
_P1ðtÞ
_P2ðtÞ
_P3ðtÞ
_P4ðtÞ
2
6664
3
7775 ¼
kH1 kH3 0 kH2
kH1PHi2PHi4 kH3 0 0
kH1PHi2PHi3 0 kH4 0
kH1PHi1 0 kH4 kH2
2
6664
3
7775
P1ðtÞ
P2ðtÞ
P3ðtÞ
P4ðtÞ
2
6664
3
7775
ð7Þ
MH0 = {1,0,0,0,0,0} i.e.,
P1ð0Þ
P2ð0Þ
P3ð0Þ
P4ð0Þ
2
6664
3
7775 ¼
1
0
0
0
2
6664
3
7775 ð8Þ
The probabilities of the VMC hardware states can be
obtained:Fig. 3 CTMC model of the VMC hardware.
Table 2 Parameters of the VMC hardware model.
Parameter Value Meaning
kH1 (h) 10
3 Mean time between failures is 103 h
Pr(tHi1) 0.5 Half of the failures make the hardware lose its function
Pr(tHi2) 0.5 Half of the failures are temporary failures
Pr(tHi3) 0.5 Half of the temporary failures will develop to permanent failures.
Pr(tHi4) 0.5 Half of the temporary failures will recover
kH2 (h) 1 Mean maintanence time is 1 h
kH3 (h) 6 Mean recovery time is 10 min
kH4 (h) 3 Mean time that temporary failures develop to permanent failures
Table 3 Steady states of the VMC software model.
No. State
1 The software operates well
1294 J. Shi et al.P1 ¼ kH2kH3kH4
A B
P2 ¼ kH1kH2kH4PHi2PHi4
A B
P3 ¼ kH1kH2kH3PHi2PHi3
A B
P4 ¼ kH1kH3kH4ðPHi1 þ PHi2PHi3Þ
A B
8>>>>><
>>>>>>:
ð9Þ
where
A ¼ ðkH1 þ kH3ÞkH2kH4 þ ðkH2 þ kH4ÞkH1kH3
B ¼ kH1kH2kH3PHi2 þ kH1kH3kH4PHi2PHi4 þ kH1kH2kH3PHi1
þ kH1kH2kH4ðPHi1 þ PHi2PHi3Þ
Given the parameters of the VMC hardware model as
shown in Table 2, the probabilities of the VMC hardware
states can be calculated.
So,
P1 ¼ 0:999123
P2 ¼ 0:000043
P3 ¼ 0:000083
P4 ¼ 0:000751
8>><
>>:
ð10Þ
Although the performance of the VMC hardware is de-
creased due to the hardware operating in the performance deg-
radation state (such as slow processing speed of the central
processor), the VMC hardware can still fulﬁll its basic func-
tions, and with the destructive factor vanishing, some HTFs
are ultimately removed and the hardware restores to good con-
dition. Therefore, only HPF is taken as the failure status of the
hardware. The reliability of the hardware is:Fig. 4 GSPN model of the VMC software.RH ¼ P1 þ P2 þ P3 ¼ 0:999249 ð11Þ3.2. GSPN model analysis of VMC software
According to the deﬁnition of GSPNW, the GSPN model of
the VMC software is established as Fig. 4 shows.
According to GSPNW, MW0 = {1,0,0,0,0,0,0}, i.e.,
#(S_op) = 1, and the VMC software is operational in the ini-
tial condition. In the hardware’s subsequent operating, it could
fail by error inputs, and then a token is transmitted to the place
S_ab, i.e., #(H_ab) = 1. Subsequently, the VMC operating
system detects this fault with self-checking software, and con-
ﬁrms whether this fault can be recovered by the software itself.
The mean detection time of the operating system is
#(tW2) = 1=kW2. The fault that the VMC software encounters
may be STF with the probability of PrðtWi2Þ or SF with the
probability of PrðtWi1Þ, and PrðtWi1Þ þ PrðtWi2Þ ¼ 1. As for
SF (i.e., #(S_fr) = 1), it will be removed by restarting the oper-
ating system software subsequently. The mean restarting time
of the software is #(tW3) = 1=kW3. As for STF (#(S_dr) = 1),
it will be removed with recovery block (RB) or N-version pro-
gramming software (NVP), and the software will recover to
normal operating subsequently. The recovering time of the
software in STF is #(tW4) = 1=kW4. However, if RB or NVP
cannot remove the software fault and the error inputFig. 5 CTMC model of the VMC software.
2 The software encounters faults due to unexpected inputs,
and then BIT program will detect the software errors later
3 The software stops working, and waits restarting
4 The fault-tolerant techniques in the software fail to remove
software faults, and then the software faults develop
to software failures ﬁnally
5 The fault-tolerant techniques in the software remove the faults,
and then the software recovers to operating state
5Table 4 Parameters of the VMC software model.
Parameter Value Meaning
kW1 (h) 2 · 103 Mean time between failures is 500 h
Pr(tWi1) 0.5 Half of the failures make the software lose its function
Pr(tWi2) 0.5 Half of the failures are temporary failures
Pr(tWi3) 0.5 Half of the temporary failures will develop to permanent failures
Pr(tWi4) 0.5 Half of the temporary failures will recover
kW2 (h) 60 Mean fault detection time is 1 min
kW3 (h) 30 Mean restart time is 2 min
kW4(h) 12 Mean time that the software recovers is 5 min
kW5 (h) 60 Mean time that temporary failures develops to permanent failures is 1 min
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of time (#(tW5) = 1=kW5), and then the software is restarted
subsequently. Whether or not RB or NVP is effective is deter-
mined by Pr(tWi4) and Pr(tWi3), and PrðtWi3Þ þ PrðtWi4Þ ¼ 1.
It can be seen from the description of GSPNW that the
model has ﬁve steady states which are summarized in Table 3.
According to Table 3 for the description of software states,
the CTMC model equivalent to the GSPN model is shown in
Fig. 5.
Based on the CTMC model of the VMC software, the state
transition equation is obtained as:
_P1ðtÞ
_P2ðtÞ
_P3ðtÞ
_P4ðtÞ
_P5ðtÞ
2
6666664
3
7777775
¼
kW1 0 kW3 0 kW4
kW1 kW2 0 0 0
0 kW2PWi1 kW3 kW5 0
0 kW2PWi2PWi3 0 kW5 0
0 kW2PWi2PWi4 0 0 kW4
2
6666664
3
7777775
P1ðtÞ
P2ðtÞ
P3ðtÞ
P4ðtÞ
P5ðtÞ
2
6666664
3
7777775
ð12Þ
MW0 = {1,0,0,0,0,0,0}, i.e.,
P1ð0Þ
P2ð0Þ
P3ð0Þ
P4ð0Þ
P5ð0Þ
2
6666664
3
7777775
¼
1
0
0
0
0
2
6666664
3
7777775
ð13Þ
The probabilities of the VMC software states can be
obtained:
P1 ¼ kW2kW3kW4kW5
CD
P2 ¼ kW1kW3kW4kW5
CD
P3 ¼ kW2kW4kW5ðkW2PWi1 þ kW5Þ
CD
P4 ¼ kW1kW2kW3kW4PWi2PWi3
CD
P5 ¼ kW1kW2kW3kW5PWi2PWi4
CD
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
ð14Þ
where
C ¼ ðkW1kW3kW4 þ kW2kW3kW4 þ kW1kW2kW3 þ kW1kW2kW4ÞkW
D ¼ kW1kW2kW3ðkW4 þ kW5ÞPWi1
þkW1kW2kW3kW5PWi2PWi3 þ kW1kW2kW4ðkW3 þ kW5ÞPWi2PWi4
8><
>:
Given the parameters of the VMC software model as shown
in Table 4, the probabilities of the VMC hardware states can
be calculated.So,
P1 ¼ 0:999866
P2 ¼ 0:000034
P3 ¼ 0:000043
P4 ¼ 0:000008
P5 ¼ 0:000049
8>>><
>>>:
ð15Þ
Although the performance of airborne computer software
decreases, such as the operation speed reduces or part of the
software module cannot be used normally, computer software
can still complete the most basic functions, and software
exception ﬁnally self-repairs and returns to its normal state
with the running of airborne computer and the elimination
of destructive factors in software operating environment.
Thus, the reliability of the software is:
RS ¼ P1 þ P2 þ P4 þ P5 ¼ 0:999957 ð16Þ3.3. GSPN comprehensive model of VMC
According the deﬁnition of GSPNV, the GSPN model of single
VMC is established as Fig. 6 shows.
In GSPNV, the transition set of TD deﬁnes all interactions
between hardware and software failures. If the VMC hardware
is in the state of HTF, i.e., #(H_re) = 1, the abnormality of the
hardware may affect the normal operation of the software,
namely, hardware faults propagate to the software, and thus
#(HtoS) = 1. With the exception inﬂuenced by HTF, the soft-
ware may encounter the following possible behaviors:
(1) #(S_ab) = 1, iff #(S_op) = 1. In this case, the exception
input from HTF causes operational software disorder,
and then the VMC operating system detects this fault
with self-checking software subsequently.
(2) #(S_dr) = 1, iff #(S_ab) = 1. In this case, the exception
input from HTF causes abnormal software disorder fur-
ther. Then the VMC operating system attempts to rec-
tify this fault with RB or NVP.
(3) #(S_fr) = 1, iff #(S_ab) = 1. In this case, the exception
input from HTF causes abnormal software failures
directly and totally.
Moreover, if the VMC hardware is in the state of HPF,
#(H_fr) = 1, #(Bd) = 1. The model clears away all tokens in
SWwith transitions of tHtSi5–tHtSi9.When the hardware recovers
after restarting or maintenance, i.e., #(H_w) = 1, VMC will re-
start with the mean rate of #(trestart), and then #(H_w) = 1, and
#(S_op) = 1.
Fig. 6 GSPN model of single VMC.
Table 5 Parameters of GSPNV.
Parameter Value Meaning
kHtS (h) 60 The mean time that hardware temporary failures aﬀect the software is 1 min
kStH (h) 30 Mean time that software failures aﬀect the hardware is 2 min
krestart (h) 30 Mean restart time is 2 min
PHtSi2 0.5 Half of the HtS failures will develop to software failures
PHtSi3 0.5 Half of the HtS failures will develop to self-recovered software faults
Table 6 Steady probabilities of single VMC model states.
No. Pr(Æ) H_w H_ab H_fr H_de H_fa H_re S_op S_ab S_de S_fa S_dr HtoS S_fr Bd S_re
M1 0.998566 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M2 0.000083 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M3 0.000743 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
M4 0.000024 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
M5 0.000053 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M6 0.000072 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
M7 0.000043 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
M8 0.000015 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
M9 0.000031 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
M10 0.000123 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
M11 0.000045 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M12 0.000020 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M13 0.000017 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
M14 0.000063 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
M15 0.000060 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
M16 0.000033 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
M17 0.000009 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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#(S_fr) = 1, the abnormality of partial hardware (such as
abnormal temperature rising of CPU) and performance degra-
dation of the hardware will occur. The mean time that SF im-
pacts on the hardware is #(tStH) = 1=kStH.Given the parameters of the VMC model as shown in Ta-
ble 5, the probabilities of the VMC states is listed in Table 6.
To single VMC, it can be seen by analyzing the states of
GSPNV shown in Table 6 that the real failure of the VMC gen-
erally includes the following three conditions.
Fig. 7 Reliability of single VMC vs MTBF of hardware.
Fig. 8 Reliability of single VMC vs MTBF of software.
Fig. 9 Simpliﬁed GSPN model of VMC.
Fig. 10 GSPN model of VMC with FMD.
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Table 6. In this case, the VMC stops and waits the hard-
ware ﬁnishing maintenance. The mean recovering time
of the VMC in this case is trepair ¼ 1=kH2.
(2) The VMC software is in the state of SF, i.e., M10, M13,
M14, and M16 in Table 6. In this case, the VMC stops
and waits the hardware restarting. The mean recovering
time of the VMC in this case is trebost ¼ 1=kW3.
(3) The VMC ﬁnishes maintenance and restarts, i.e., M7 in
Table 6. The mean recovering time of the VMC in this
case is trestart ¼ 1=krestart.
Therefore, the real reliability of the VMC is
RVMC ¼ 1 PrðM3Þ  PrðM10Þ  PrðM13Þ  PrðM14Þ
 PrðM16Þ  PrðM7Þ
¼ 0:998978 ð17Þ
Fig. 7 shows the variation curve of respective state reliabil-
ity of single airborne computer with the change of mean time
between hardware failures.
As shown in Fig. 7, the reliability of the VMC increases
with the growth of hardware MTBF. Due to the interactions
between hardware and software faults, the real reliability of
the VMC is obviously lower than the product of hardware
and software reliabilities.
The reliabilities of hardware, software, and VMC vs MTBF
of the software are illustrated in Fig. 8.
As shown in Fig. 8, the reliability of the VMC increases
with the growth of software MTBF. Due to the interactions
between hardware and software, the real reliability of the
VMC is obviously lower than the product of hardware and
software reliabilities. However, with the growth of software
reliability, the effect that a software fault exerts on thehardware correspondingly reduces, and the real reliability of
the VMC constantly approaches the product of hardware
and software reliabilities.
In order to simplify the reliability analysis of RVMCS, it is
supposed that the VMC has only two states: failed and opera-
tional. Fig. 9 describes the simpliﬁed GSPNV with equivalent
mean failure rate kd and mean recovering rate ld. Simpliﬁed
GSPNV is a basic repairable system. Vup in Fig. 9 denotes
the operational state of the VMC, and Vdn denotes the failed
state of the VMC. The most important thing about the simpli-
ﬁed model is to determine equivalent failure rate kd and main-
tenance rate ld.
Simpliﬁed GSPN reliability model of the VMC is a basic
repairable system model. Vup represents that the VMC is oper-
ational, and Vdn represents that the VMC is faulty. Therefore,
equivalent failure rate and recovering rate need to be identiﬁed
in the simpliﬁed model.
By effective state analysis of GSPNV, VMC failed states in-
clude:M3,M7,M10,M13,M14, andM16, amongwhich, themean
recovering time inM3 is trepair, themean recovering time inM7 is
trestart, and the mean recovering time ofM10,M13,M14, andM16
is trebost; therefore, the expected value ofmean recovering time is:
T ¼ ½PðM3Þ þ PðM7Þtrepair
þ PðM10Þ þ PðM13Þ þ PðM14Þ þ PðM16Þ½ trebost ð18Þ
Take ld = 1/T as the mean VMC recovering rate. Accord-
ing to the theory of repairable system, the reliability of the
VMC is:
RVMC ¼ ldkd þ ld
ð19Þ
Thus, equivalent failure rate kd of simpliﬁed GSPNV can be
identiﬁed.
FromTables 1, 3 and 5, we can obtain: ld = 7.652 · 104 /h,
kd ¼ 7:8 107 /h.
3.4. GSPN model of VMC with FMD
In order to effectively monitor VMC operating state, FMD,
such as BIT and MVD, are usually installed in vehicle manage-
Fig. 11 State probabilities of VMC with FMD vs fault moni-
toring coverage.
Table 7 GSPN model states with PHM of single airborne computer.
No. Pr(Æ) V1.up V1.dn V1.EF V1.DF V1.vup V1.VA V1.vdn
M1 0.981159 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
M2 0.000866 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
M3 0.000152 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
M4 0.017823 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
1298 J. Shi et al.ment system (VMS). Considering the effects of fault monitor-
ing coverage and false alarming rate of FMD, the GSPN mod-
el of VMC is established as shown in Fig. 10.
In the GSPN model of VMC with FMD, the value of
#(V1.vup) is the indicator to identify VMC failure undetected
state. Pr(td) deﬁnes the fault monitoring coverage that FMD
can successfully detect VMC’s faults, and thus Pr(tud) is the
fault undetected probability of FMD, and Pr(tud) +
Pr(td) = 1. If VMC encounters a failure, i.e., #(V1.dn =
1) = 1, the failure will be detected by FMD with the probabil-
ity of Pr(td), and then #(V1.DF) = 1 and #(V1.vup) = 0. Other-
wise, the failure will not be detected by FMD with the
probability of Pr(tud), and then #(V1.EF) = 1 and #(V1.vup) = 1.
If VMC in failure undetected state is very dangerous to airplanes,
it is a serious threat to ﬂight safety.
On the other hand, the value of #(V1.vdn) is the indicator to
identify the state that the operational VMC is identiﬁed incor-
rectly as failed by FMD. Pr(tva) deﬁnes the false alarming
probability that FMD incorrectly identiﬁes operational VMC
as failed VMC, and thus Pr(tnva) is the probability that
FMD correctly identiﬁes operational VMC, and
Pr(tva) + Pr(tnva) = 1. If VMC is operational, i.e.,
#(V1.up = 1) = 1, the operational VMC may be identiﬁed
incorrectly as failed by FMD with the probability of Pr(tva),
and then #(V1.DF) = 1 and #(V1.vdn) = 1. The bigger false
alarming probability of FMD will decrease the utilization of
VMC; therefore, decreasing the false alarming probability of
FMD becomes an important task in FMD design.
Given Pr(tva) = 0.1 and Pr(tud) = 0.15, 21 reachable mark-
ings of models is available, of which 4 effective states are
shown in Table 7.
It can be found from the states of the GSPN model of VMC
with FMD in Table 7 that M1 represents that the VMC is opera-
tional without false alarming and M2 represents that the failed
VMC is successfully detected by FMD. M3 represents that the
failed VMC is undetected by FMD and airborne panel displays
that the VMC is still operational. Therefore,M3 is extremely dan-
gerous to airplanes and it is a serious threat to ﬂight safety. M4
represents that the operational VMC is incorrectly identiﬁed as
failed by FMD and airborne panel displays that the VMC is
unavailable. It decreases the utilization of VMC.
IfM3 andM4 occur, the false operations by the airplane pi-
lot will be taken. Especially, M3 will bring potential fatal fail-
ures. Therefore, the probability of M3 should be reduced as
much as possible in FMD design. M4 will reduce actual efﬁ-
ciency of VMC; therefore, the probability of M4 should be re-
duced as designing FMD.
With FMD, the real reliability of VMC is RFMDVMC ¼
0:981159. Compared with Eq. (17), the reliability of VMC with
FMD is lower than that of an ideal VMC.
Given that the false alarming probability of FMD is 0.1, the
state probabilities of VMC with FMD vs fault monitoring cov-
erage are shown in Fig. 11.It can be found from Fig. 11 that the actual reliability of
VMC with FMD is not increased but reduced with the decline
of fault monitoring coverage Pr(td). This result is because of
the fact that the operational time of VMC will increase for
more failures are detected and removed successfully due to lar-
ger fault monitoring coverage. The increase of VMC operating
time adds the probability that FMD incorrectly identiﬁes oper-
ational VMC as failed VMC. In other words, the probability
of VMC in false alarming state is increased accordingly.
Based on this result, it cannot improve VMC’s reliability
and utility really only by increasing the fault monitoring
Fig. 12 State probabilities of VMC with FMD vs false alarming
probability.
Fig. 13 Ideal GSPN model of RVMS without FMD.
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FMD.
Given that the fault monitoring coverage is 0.15, the state
probabilities of VMC with FMD vs false alarming probability
are shown in Fig. 12.
It can be found from Fig. 12 that the actual reliability of
VMC with FMD is reduced with the increase of false alarming
probability Pr(tva). The probabilities of M2 and M3 are nearly
changeless with the increase of false alarming probability.
However, the probability of VMC in invalid states increases
obviously. Some of invalid states of VMC are caused by actual
failures, but considerable invalid states are caused by FMD
false judgment.Table 8 States of the GSPN model of ideal RVMCS.
No. Pr(Æ) S.up V1.dn
M1 0.997958 1 0
M2 0.001017 1 1
M3 0.001024 1 0
M4 0.000001 0 14. GSPN model of RVMCS
4.1. GSPN model of ideal RVMCS
Without FMD, the ideal GSPN model of RVMCS is shown in
Fig. 13.
As shown in Fig. 13, RVMCS is operational if any of
VMC1 and VMC2 is operational, i.e., #(S.up = 1), iff
#(V1.up = 1) or #(V2.up = 1). RVMCS is failed if both of
VMC1 and VMC2 are failed, i.e., #(S.dn = 1), iff
#(V1.dn = 1) and #(V2.dn = 1).
It can be seen by model simulation that the model has 13
reachable states among which four effective states can be iden-
tiﬁed as shown in Table 8.
According to Table 8, M1 represents that both of VMC1
and VMC2 are operational. In this case, RVMCS is opera-
tional. M2 represents that VMC2 is operational but VMC1 is
failed. M3 represents that VMC1 is operational but VMC2 is
failed. In the cases of M2 and M3, although the performance
of RVMCS degrades due to one of VMCs is failed, RVMCS
can still perform its basic ﬂight control functions. Therefore,
the available states of RVMCS include M1, M2, and M3, i.e.,
Rsys ¼ PrfM1g þ PrfM2g þ PrfM3g ¼ 0:999999 ð20Þ
Compared with Eq. (17), an ideal redundant VMC system
greatly improves the reliability of single VMC.
4.2. GSPN Model of RVMCS with FMD
Taking the inﬂuences of limited fault monitoring coverage and
false alarming probability of FMD into account, the GSPN-
based reliability model of RVMCS can be established as shown
in Fig. 14.
Given Pr(tva) = 0.1 and Pr(tud) = 0.15, the number of
reachable states is 70. It can be seen by model simulation that
the model has 70 reachable states. Among them, 13 effective
states can be identiﬁed as shown in Table 9.
As shown in Table 9, M1 presents that both of VMCs are
operational, so accordingly, RVMCS operates well. M2 and
M3 present that one VMC operates well but the other fails,S.dn V2.dn V1.up V2.up
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
Fig. 14 GSPN Model of RVMCS with FMD.
Table 9 Description and probabilities of effective states of RVMCS.
No. Pr(Æ) V1.up V1.dn V1.EF V1.DF V1.vup V1.VA V1.vdn
M1 0.801761 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
M2 0.000741 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
M3 0.000875 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
M4 0.076267 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
M5 0.000077 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
M6 0.000125 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
M7 0.109606 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
M8 0.000071 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
M9 0.000108 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
M10 0.010316 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
M11 0.000035 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
M12 0.000015 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
M13 0.000003 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
No. Pr(Æ) V2.up V2.dn V2.EF V2.DF V2.vup V2.VA V2.vdn R.up R.dn
M1 0.801761 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
M2 0.000741 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
M3 0.000875 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
M4 0.076267 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
M5 0.000077 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
M6 0.000125 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
M7 0.109606 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
M8 0.000071 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
M9 0.000108 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
M10 0.010316 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
M11 0.000035 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
M12 0.000015 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
M13 0.000003 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
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Fig. 15 Probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states and
false alarming states vs fault monitoring coverage.
Fig. 16 Probabilities of undetected states and incorrect detected
states of RVMCS.
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detected by FMD. M4 and M7 present that one VMC oper-
ates well but the other operational VMC is identiﬁed incor-
rectly as failed by FMD. M5 and M6 present that one
VMC operates well but the other failed VMC is not identiﬁed
successfully by FMD. M8 and M9 present that one failed
VMC is identiﬁed successfully but the other operational
VMC is incorrectly identiﬁed as failed by FMD. M10 presents
that both of the operational VMCs are incorrectly identiﬁed
as failed by FMD. M11 and M12 present that one failed VMC
is not identiﬁed by FMD but the other operational VMC is
identiﬁed as failed. M13 presents that both of the failed
VMCs are identiﬁed successfully by FMD, and thus RVMCS
is failed.
Due to the inﬂuences of limited fault monitoring coverage
and false alarming probability of FMD, the failure undetected
states and false alarming states inevitably exist in RVMCS.
According to Table 9, the probabilities of RVMCS failure
undetected states and RVMCS false alarming states are
RUDRVMCS ¼ PrðM5Þ þ PrðM6Þ þ PrðM11Þ þ PrðM12Þ
¼ 0:000252 ð21Þ
RFARVMCS ¼ PrðM4Þ þ PrðM7Þ þ PrðM8Þ þ PrðM9Þ
þ PrðM10Þ þ PrðM11Þ þ PrðM12Þ
¼ 0:196418 ð22Þ
Given that the false alarming probability of FDM is 0.1, the
probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states and
RVMCS false alarming states versus the fault monitoring cov-
erage are shown in Fig. 15.
It can be seen from Fig. 15 that the probabilities of
RVMCS failure undetected states decrease with the increaseof undetected rate of FDM, but the probabilities of RVMCS
false alarming states increase. This result is because of the
fact that the operational time of RVMCS will increase for
more failures are detected and removed successfully due to
larger fault monitoring coverage. The increase of RVMCS
operating time adds the probability that FMD incorrectly
identiﬁes operational VMC as failed VMC. In other words,
the probability of RVMCS in false alarming states is in-
creased accordingly.
Given that the fault monitoring coverage of FDM is 0.85,
the probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states and
RVMCS false alarming states versus the false alarming proba-
bility are shown in Fig. 16.
It can be seen from Fig. 16 that the probabilities of
RVMCS false alarming states increase with the increase of
false alarming probability, but the probabilities of RVMCS
failure undetected states decline.
According to the states of RVMCS with FMD, the per-
formance of RVMCS in M2 and M3 is degraded due to one
failed VMC. The utility of RVMCS in M4, M7, and M9 is
reduced due to the fact that one operational VMC is iden-
tiﬁed incorrectly as failed by FMD. Although RVMCS in
M2, M3, M4, M7, and M9 will reduce its performance or
utility to a certain extent, RVMCS is still available to
VMS; therefore, the actual reliability of RVMCS can be ob-
tained as
RFMDRVMCS ¼ PrðM1Þ þ PrðM2Þ þ PrðM3Þ þ PrðM4Þ
þ PrðM7Þ þ PrðM9Þ ¼ 0:989358 ð23Þ
Compared with Eq. (19), RVMCS with FMD is less reliable
than the ideal RVMCS. This is resulted from the inﬂuences of
fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of
FMD.
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undetected by FMD, RVMC operating in the state of M5
and M6 will produce a potential threat to the safety of VMS.
Therefore, the probability that RVMCS operates with risk of
safety is
PrsRVMCS ¼ PrðM5Þ þ PrðM6Þ ¼ 0:000202 ð24Þ
Moreover, due to the inﬂuence that one failed VMC is
undetected and the other operational VMC is identiﬁed incor-
rectly as failed by FMD, RVMC operating in the state of M11
and M12 will produce a fatal threat to the safety of VMS.
Therefore, the probability that RVMCS operates with fatal
danger is
PfdRVMCS ¼ PrðM11Þ þ PrðM12Þ ¼ 0:000049 ð25Þ
RVMCS operating with both risk of safety and fatal danger
will inﬂuence the pilot’s judgment and then lead to the pilot’s
later dangerous operating. Therefore, PrsRVMCS and P
fd
RVMCS
must be reduced by efﬁcient technical methods during FMD
design.
5. Conclusions
By advantages of generalized stochastic Petri nets, this paper
establishes the reliability and safety models of redundant vehi-
cle management computer system, and analyzes the potential
threats to ﬂight control system. The main contributions and
conclusions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(1) As a typical fault dependency system, the reliability of
VMC is not the product of hardware reliability and soft-
ware reliability. The interactions between hardware and
software faults can reduce the real reliability of VMC
obviously. How to reduce the interactions between hard-
ware and software faults (such as good thermal design of
VMC) should be studied during VMC design.
(2) Although redundant techniques adopted in VMC can
improve VMC’s reliability to a certain extent, failure
undetected states and false alarming states inevitably
exist in RVMCS due to the inﬂuences of limited
fault monitoring coverage and false alarming proba-
bility of FMD. RVMC operating in some failure
undetected states will produce a fatal threat to the
safety of VMS. RVMC operating in some false
alarming states will reduce utility of RVMCS obvi-
ously. Therefore, the performance and efﬁciency of
FMD should be carefully designed and veriﬁed dur-
ing FMD design.
The results abstracted in this paper can guide reliable
VMC and efﬁcient FMD designs. The methods adopted in
this paper can also be used to analyze other intelligent sys-
tems’ reliability.Acknowledgements
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